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EXPERT TESTIMONY
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
The admissibility of expert testimony depends on several factors: (1) the subject matter. of the testimony, (2) the
qualifications of the expert, (3) the conformity of the evidence to a generally accepted explanatory theory, and
(4) whether the probative value of the testimony outweighs other considerations. See United States v. Amaral, 488 E2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Chapple,
135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (1983); lbn-Tamas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632-39 (D.C. 1979), appeal
on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
The fourth factor deals with the trial court's discretion
to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, confusion of issues, or considerations such
as undue delay and needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 governs this is, sue. The standard that the appellate courts use to review
;a trial court's decision under Rule 403 is an abuse of
discretion. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence, 403[02] (1982). Although this standard grants
the trial court wide discretion, this discretion is not limited. For example, in United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924
(2d Cir. 1976), the accused's attempt to call a second expert to tesitify on an insanity defense was rejected by the
trial court. The trial court, however, refused to explain the
basis for its decision despite a defense request for an explanation. The Second Circuit reversed:
Although Rule 403 has placed great discretion in the trial
judge, discretion does not mean immunity from accountability .... Unfortunately, where the reasons for a discretionary
ruling are not apparent to counsel, they will probably not be
apparent to an appellate court. We therefore find it difficult
to comprehend the district judge's adamant refusal to respond to defense counsel's inquiries. The spirit of Rule 403
would have been better served had the judge "confront[ed]
the problem explicity, acknowledging and weighing both the
prejudice and the probative worth" of the proffered testimony. /d. at 928.

SUBJECT MATTER OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
An expert may tesitfy only on a matter that is a proper
subject for expert testimony. See J. Maguire, Evidence,
Common Sense and Common Law 30 (1947) ("The field

of expertness is bounded on one side by the great area
of the common place, supposedly within the ken of every
person of moderate intelligence, and on the other by the
even greater area of the speculative and uncertain. Of
course, both these boundaries constantly shift ....").
The trial court is entrusted with determining whether the
testimony is a proper subject for an expert. As the Supreme Court has noted, the trial court has "broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert
evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous." Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370
U.S. 31, 35 (1962).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that expert
testimony is admissible if "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
See generally 3D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 382 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra ,
702 [01]. According to the federal drafters:
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge
which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the
'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all 'specialized'
knowledge .... Thus within the scope of the rule are not
only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group
sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or
landowners testifying to land values. Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The standard adopted by Rule 702- whether expert
testimony will "assist the trier of fact" - is a more liberal
formulation of the subject matter requirement than that
which is found in many common law opinions, which
often phrased the requirement as whether the subject
was beyond the comprehension of laymen. E.g, Fineberg
v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968) ("beyond the knowledge of the average layman") ; Jenkins v.
United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("beyond
the ken of the average layman"). Under Rule 702, "the
test is not whether the jury could reach some conclusion
in the absence of the expert evidence, but whether the
jury is qualified without such testimony 'to determine
intelligently and to the best possible degree the particu-
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lar issue without enlightenment from those having a
specializediH1del'stanclilig oftnfrsuojecr. .. : " State
v. Chaple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219-20
(1983).
This test is consistent with Wigmore's formulation of
the test for expert testimony: "On this subject can a
jury receive from this person appreciable help?" 7 J.
Wigmore,, Evidence § 1923, at 29 (Chadbourn rev.
1978f See also Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L.
Rev. 414, 418 (1952): "There is no more certain test for
determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman
would. be qiJ~Iifi~gto g~t~rmin_e int~IJig~Qtly and to the
best possible degree the particular issue without en. lightenment from· those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute."
The difference between fhEdwo standards can be
illustrated by two examples. First, many courts have
excluded expert testimony concerning the unreliability
of eyewitness identifications because "the trustworthiness in general of eyewitness observations [is] not
beyond the ken of'~thefjuror.:c .. .'' State v. Porraro, 121
R.I. 882, 892, 404 A.2d 4p5, 471 (1979). See also
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616; 641-42 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Gir. 1973); Perry
v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 370-71, 642 S.W.2d 865, 872
(1982); Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.
1980); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453
N.E.2d 1204, 1207-09 {198~); State v. Helterbridle, 301
N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980).
In State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208
(1983),-howevE)r; the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that
the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding
such testirn.OIJY~ inJighLoLthe.Jacts oUhat case. According to the court, "[e]ven assuming that jurors of
ordinary education need no expert testimony to enlighten them to the danger of eyewitness identification,
the offer of proof indicated that [the expert's] testimony
would have informed the jury that there are many specific variables which affect the accuracy ()f identification and which apply to the facts of this case." 660
P.2d
1220. See also United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1984); People v.
McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 721, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236, 248 (1984).
A second ex<unple involves expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome. The battered
woman syndrome describes a pattern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. Typically, evidence of
the syndrome is offered to a support a self-defense
claim in a homicide prosecution of the woman for the
death of her mate. Some courts have upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on this issue because "the
subject of the expert testimony is within the understanding of the jury." State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d
518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
In contrast, other courts have held this testimony
admissible because it tends to explain two elements of
the self-defense claim: (1) the woman's subjective fear
of serious injury or death and (2) the reasonableness

of that belief. For example, the battered woman syndrome may explain why a battered woman has not left
her mate. See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196, 478 A.2d
364, 372 (1984) ("Only by understanding these unique
pressures that force battered women to remain with
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that
being a battered woman creates, can a battered woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood.''). According to these courts, the evidence
supplies "an interpretation of the facts which differed
from the ordinary lay perception ... .'' lbn-=l"amas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979),
appeal on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). In so
holding, these courts have taken the position that the
test for admission is whether the expert testimony
sheds light on a relevant issue which a lay person,
without expert assistance, would not perceive from the
evidence itself. /d. at 633. Accord Hawthorne v. State,
408 So.2d 801, 806(Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v.
State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981):
State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 893-94 (Me. 1981).
QUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS
Federal Evidence Rule 702 provides that a witness
may qualify as an expert by reason of "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.'' See generally
3 D. Louise II & C. Mueller, supra, § 381; 3 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, super 1 702 [04]. The rule comports with
Wigmore's view; he wrote that the witness' expertise
"may have been attained, so far as legal rules go, in
any way whatever; all the law requires is that it should
have been attained.'' 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556, at
751 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
Determining whether a witness is properly qualified
is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion and
thus is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. See Fed. A. Evid. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness ... shall be determined by the court. .. .'');
Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35
(1962) (trial court has "broad discretion in the matter
of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and
his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.''). Although the trial court is given wide latitude
on this issue, there are certain recognized limitations
on this discretion. For example, in reversing a trial
court's ruling that a defense fingerprint expert was
unqualified, the Sixth Circuit wrote:

at

An expert need not have certificates of training, nor
memberships in professional organizations .... Nor
need he be, as the trial court apparently required, an
outstanding practitioner in the field in which he professes expertise. Comparisons between his professional
stature and the stature of witnesses for an opposing
party may be made by the jury, if it becomes necessary to decide which of two conflicting opinions to believe. But the only question for the trial judge who
must decide whether or not to allow the jury to consider a proffered expert's opinion is, "whether his knowledge of the subject matter is such that his opinion will
most likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the
truth." United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024
(6th Cir. 1977).
2
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Similarly, the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial court's
ruling that psychologists were not qualified to testify
on the issue of insanity because they lacked medical
training. Jenkins v. United States, 307, F.2d 637, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1962). The court, however, was careful to
point out that a witness' qualifications must be based
on the nature and extent of his knowledge and not on
. his title. /d. at 644-45. On one hand, many psychologists would not be qualified to express an opinion on
insanity because their "training and experience may
not provide an adequate basis for their testimony." /d.
at 644. On the other hand, other psychologists, because of their training and experience in the diagnosis
and treatment of mental disorders, may be qualified.

courts must "differentiate between ability to operate an
instrument or perform a test and the ability to make
an interpretation drawn from use of the instrument."
People v. King, 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 457, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 478, 491, (1968).~ For example, a police officer
may be qualified to operate a breathalyzer but not
qualified to interpret the results. See French v. State,
484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). The training and experience needed to perform these two distinct functions is very different. See State v. James, 68
Ohio App. 2d 227, 229, 428 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1980)
(state trooper qualified as an expert in the operation of
intoxilyzer, but did not possess sufficient learning and
knowledge to testify about effects of alcohol consumption).

/d.
Cour:ts also have recognized that experience alone
may qualify a witness to express an opinion. For example, an FBI agent is qualified to testify that a substance is cocaine based on four years of experience
during which time he identified cocaine by sight on 35
occasions and his identifications had been"confirmed
by laboratory analysis in most cases. United States v.
Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976). See a/so United States v.
Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (experier:JCed marijuana smoker qualified to testify that certain marijuana came from Columbia), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 907 (1979); State v. Essick, 67 N.C. App. 697, 314
S.E.2d 268, 270 (1984) (detective better qualified than
jury to draw inference that vegetable matter was marijuana). But see People v. Park, 72 111.2d 203, 380
-. N.E.2d 795 (1978) (deputy sheriff not qualified to idenci1 tify marijuana). See generally DeFoor, Consumer Testimony as Proof of Identity of the Controlled Substance
in a Narcotics Case, 33 U.Fia. L. Rev. 682 (1981).
Testimony by police experts on the modus operandi
of various types of crime has also been admitted. See
United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 358 (11th Cir.
1983) (counterfeiting techniques); United States v.
Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1247 n.19 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1979); United States v. Scavo,
593 F.2d 837, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1979) (bookmaking
operations); United States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574,
576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (pickpocketing). See a/so United
States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983)
(agent qualified to testify regarding typical characteristics of heroin addicts). See generally Note, Police
Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule, 44 La.
L. Rev. 211 (1983).
An expert's testimony must relate to the subject
matter on which he is qualified. In other words, a
witness may be qualified to express an opinion on one
matter but not on another. For example, a criminologist
may be qualified to testify that no fingerprints were
found on an object but not qualified to testify that the
absence of fingerprints resulted from the fact that
gloves were used or that the prints were wiped away:
"The government has failed to show that [the expert's]
training qualifies him as an expert with respect to the
1 reason no fingerprints were found ...." United States
v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly,
a witness may be an expert on one aspect of a scientific technique but not on other aspects. Accordingly,

BASES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert witnesses are permitted to express opinions.
As the drafters of the Federal Rules noted, however,
an expert is not required to testify in the form of opinions, and thus Federal Rule 702 provides that an expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Accordingly, an expert "may give a dissertation
or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the
facts." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. A. Evid. 702.
Expert opinion testimony may be based on three
different types of facts in a particular case: (1) the
expert's personal knowledge, (2) assumed facts supported by evidence in the record, typically in the form
of a hypothetical question, and (3) information supplied to the expert outside of the trial. Federal Rule
703 recognizes all three sources; many jurisdictions
do not recognize (3). See generally 3 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra, §§ 387-90; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra, , 703 [01).
Expert witnesses frequently express opinions based
on their personal observations. For example, the forensic chemist who examines a substance and concludes
it is a controlled substance will express an opinion
concerning the identity of the substance based on his
firsthand knowledge. Similarly, the forensic pathologist
who expresses an opinion about the cause of death in
a homicide case, after conducting an autopsy, is basing his. opinion on personal observation.
Hypothetical Questions
Experts may also base their opinions on assumed
facts that are supported by evidence in the record. In
some jurisdictions, an expert who has attended the
trial is permitted to assume that the evidence adduced
at trial is true and express an opinion based on this
evidence. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 681 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); C. McCormick, Evidence § 14 (3d ed.
1984). The major deficiency of this procedure is that
the jury may not understand which facts the expert is
assuming to be true, a problem which is particularly
pronounced in a long, complicated trial or where the
evidence is conflicting.
An expert also may express an opinion based on
assumed facts that are stated in the form of a hypothetical question. The hypothetical question has two
principal advantages. First, it informs the jury of the
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facts upon which the expert's opinion is based. Secit provides the opposing party with an opportunity
object before an opinion is expressed, if the question contains assumed facts which are not supported
by evidence admitted at trial. Despite these advantages, the hypothetical question has been criticized as
a cumbersome and unwieldly device which often
precludes the expert f~om fully explaining his opinion
to the jury. As one court has noted, "[r]ather than
inducing a clear expression of expert opinion and the
basis for it, [the hypothetical question] inhibits the
expert and forecloses him from explaining his reasoning in a manner that is intelligibl~ _to a jury." Rabata v.
Dohner, 45 Wis.2d 111, 129, 172 N.W.2d 409, 417
(1969). Federal Rule 703 permits an expert to give an
opinion without resort to a hypothetical question, even
if the expert lacks personal knowledge of the underlying facts.

seized quaaludeswere made by the same machine as
the other tablets from Colombia. The defendants objected to this testimony on the ground that the expert's
opinion regarding the origin of the sample tablet was
based on hearsay. The court rejected the argument:
"Under F.R.E. Rule 703 ... an expert may base his
testimony upon the type of hearsay he would normally
rely upon in the course of his work .... D.E.A. forensic scientists rely upon agents in the field to submit
samples and to establish their authenticity as is shown
by the fact that the pill in question was catalogued
and kept for sample use by the D.E.A." /d. at 1206.
The admissibility of expert opinions based on nonrecord facts raises several issues. First, how does the
trial court determine what types of information are reasonably relied upon in a particular field? The federal
drafters provided little guidance on this issue. The Advisory Committee's Note merely comments that the
"opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point of
impact in an automobile collision based on the statements of bystanders" would not satisfy the requirement. While the court must decide whether there is
reasonable reliance in a particular field, the rule does
not permit the court to substitute its own notion of
what reliance is reasonable. One court has written that
the "proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem it
to be." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983). The trial court,
however, need not accept the testifying expert's view
of what is reasonably relied upon by experts in a
particular field. See Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
A second issue concerns how the jury may use the
out-of-court information once it is admitted. Although
Rule 703 permits an expert to base his opinion on
hearsay information, it does not explicitly recognize a
hearsay exception for this information. Under one
view, the jury can consider the information only in
evaluating the expert's opinion; it cannot use the information substantively, i.e., for the truth of the assertions
contained therein. See United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d
147, 149-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845
(1975). See generally Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction
of Underlying Data, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 234 (1984).
Other authorities, however, envision the substantive
use of the information, creating in effect another
hearsay exception. C. McCormick, supra, at§ 324.2.
See also M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence
631 (1981) ("For most but not all practical purposes,
Rule 703 operates as the equivalent of an additional
exception to the rule against hearsay ....").
In criminal trials, the use of hearsay evidence as a
basis for expert opinion testimony raises confrontation
issues. In United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982), the defense objected to the testimony of a prosecution psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was sane.
The expert had limited personal contact with the defendant and relied on hearsay information in formulating his opinion. The court ruled the testimony had
been properly admitted. According to the court, reli-
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If a hypothetical question is used to elicit expert
opinion testimony, there may be an issue concerning
the adequacy of the facts assumed in the hypothetical.
There is a danger that the question will contain a onesided view of the relevant issues; for example, adverse
facts may be omitted from the hypothetical question.
In such a case the jury may give undue weight to the
expert's opinion without fully appreciating the inadequacy of the underlying factual bases. Because of this
problem, some jurisdictions require the hypothetical to
include the "material" facts in the case. C. McCormick, supra, at 37. Other jurisdictions reject this requirement, leaving the opponent with the responsibility
of highlighting such omissions in cross-examination or
reformulating the hypothetical question to include the
omitted-facts, /d.
Non-Record Facts
In addition, Rule 703 permits an expert to express
an opinion based on information that has not been admitted at trial and, indeed, may be inadmissible: "If of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inference upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 703. See also Soden v.
Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1983)
(the inquiry under Rule 703 "must be made on a
case-by-case basis and should focus on the reliability
of the opinion and its foundation rather than on the
fact that it was based, technically speaking, on hearsay").
·
This rule permits an expert to base his opinion on
hearsay evidence. According to one court: "The rationale in favor of the admissibility of expert testimony
based on hearsay is that the expert is fully capable of
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis
for his opinion. This relates directly to one of the functions of the expert witness, namely to lend his special
expertise to the issue before him." United States v.
Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 845 (1975). For example, in United States v. Arias,
678 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910
(1982), a chemist, based on a comparison of quaaludes seized from the defendants and quaaludes supplied by DEA agents in Columbia, testified that the
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ance on staff reports, interviews conducted by other
psychiatrists, and background information from military
and prosecutorial records was "clearly of the type that
psychiatrists would rely upon in making a similar professional judgment" and thus satisfied the requirements of Rule 703. /d. at 302. Although the court also
rejected the defendant's confrontation argument, it
recognized the cogency of that argument in certain
circumstances: "An expert's testimony that was based
entirely on hearsay reports, while it might satisfy Rule
703, would nevertheless violate a defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Government could not, for example, simply produce a witness
who did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements
by others." /d. at 302. See also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971) (testimony of expert
on .the value of land, based on documents and records not admitted in evidence, did not violate the right
of confrontation), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972);
Stae v. Henderson, 554S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn. 1977)
(admission of laboratory report through the testimony
of the director of the laboratory violated confrontation
right).
In State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982),
a prosecution expert testified that the defendant was
sexually disturbed but not mentally ill. To support his
opinion the expert cited a book, which had been written by a friend of his. He also testified that he had
spoken by telepnone with the author about the case
and that the author agreed with his opinion. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the expert's references
to the author did not come within the rule allowing an
expert to base his opinion upon facts not admissible
in evidence but reasonably relied on by experts in the
field. Instead, the court found that the witness was in
effect " 'acting as a conduit' for the other doctor's
opinion." /d. at 246, 453 A.2d at 1135. According to the
court, not only was the opinion hearsay, but it also
violated ,the defendant's right of confrontation. See
Carlson, supra, at 248 ("For such support to come
from a nontestifying expert insulated from cross-examiation presents a difficult, almost impossible situation
for the opponent of the evidence.").
A related confrontation issue arises where a supervising chemist identifies a substance based, at least in
part, on tests performed by other chemists. Several
courts have upheld this practice if the supervising
chemist testifies that the tests were perfomed under
his personal supervision. See State v. Reardon, 172
Conn. 593, 376 A.2d 65 (1977); State v. Ecklund, 30
Wash. App. 313, 633 P.2d 933 (1981). See also United
States v. Posey, 647 F.2d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Manning, 495 Pa. 652, 660-61, 435
A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (1981) (testimony of supervising toxicologist who identified PCP based on tests performed
under his direction admitted); Commonwealth v. Gilliard, 300 Pa. Super. 469, 476, 446 A.2d 951, 954
(1982) (testimony of medical examiner based on toxicologist report admitted); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d
112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975).
The issue, however, remains controversial. One federal district court has held that his practice violates
the right of confrontation, but that case was subse-

quently reversed on other grounds. Readon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982 (D. Conn. 1980), rev'd on procedural grounds, 644 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). See also
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 914-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (court declines to decide this "difficult"
question); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, at 703-24
("in a criminal case, even though Rule 703 does not
prohibit the use of hearsay as a basis for an opinion,
the constitutional right of confrontation may require
that the defendant have the opportunity to cross examine the persons who prepared the underlying data on
which the expert relies."). But see Ardoin v. State, 582
S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App. 1984) (statute authorizes custodian to testify about procedures used in test even
though he did not conduct the test).
DEGREE OF CERTITUDE
Some jurisdicitons require an expert to express an
opinion in terms of reasonable scientific probability or
certainty. See generally 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1976
(Chadbourn rev. 1978); Joseph, Less Than Certain
Medical Testimony, 14 Trial 51 (Jan. 1978}; McElhaney,
Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
28 Mercer L. Rev. 463, 477 (1977). For example, in
State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969),
an expert, based on neutron activation analysis, testified that two hair samples were "similar and . . . likely
to be from the same source:• /d. at 85, 246 N.E.2d at
368. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, this testimony did not satisfy the reasonable certainty or probability standard and thus was inadmissible. /d. at 86,
246 N.E.2d at 368.
The Holt case is wrong. Frequently, experts testify
that two samples "could have come from the same
source" or "were likely to be from the same source:'
Such testimony meets the relevancy standard adopted
by Federal Rule 401, and there is no requirement in
the Federal Rules that an expert's opinion be expressed in terms of "probabilities." For example, in
United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977), the expert testified
that hair samples found on items used in a robbery
"could have come from the defendants." /d. at 1072.
The defendants argued that the testimony was
inadmissible because the expert did not express his
opinion in terms of reasonable scientific certainty. The
court wrote: "There is no such requirement. To the
extent State v. Holt ... expresses a contrary view, we
find it unpersuasive." /d.
See also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 526
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978) (expert's
opinion regarding hair comparison admissible even
though expert was less than certain); United States v.
Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1049 (2d Cir. 1971) (expert's
opinion regarding handwriting comparison admissible
even though expert did not make a positive identification); United State v. Longfellow, 406 F.2d 415, 416 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969) (expert's
opinion regarding paint comparison admissible, even
though expert did not make a positive identification);
State v. Boyer, 406 So.2d 143, 148 (La. 1981) (reasonable scientific certainty not required where expert testifies concerning the presence of gunshot residue
based on neutron activation analysis).
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In 1.~84 Congr(3SS amended Rule 704 by adding a
new subdivision (b) to Rule 704:

UlTIMATE ISSUE RUlE

·:P:fc'~ht'-t"i·;;;e:-b6lii'TIIY~~~d'-exil~rt~~ll~esses were prohibitea from expressing opinions on the ultimate isrule was sometimes justified on
the grounds that such opinions "invade the province
of the jury" or "usurp the function of the jury."

No expert witness testifying )Nith respect to the mental
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant
did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense
thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.
Thus, while Rule 704 generally abrogates the
ultimate issue rule, a special exception applies in
cases in which a defendant's mental condition is in
issue - for example, where insanity is raised as a
defense.

sues~irt;a~:QaSJ~;This

There _ar€} $eVE3Iat propi~!TI~_WiU:tth~ ultimate issue
rule. First, difficult questions of application are involved in distinguishing "ultimate facts" from other
facts. C. McCormick, supra, § 12. Second, a witness
cannot usurp the function of the jury because the jury
is not bound to accept a witness' opinion, including
tfie opinion· of ·an expert. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence §
1920 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (ultimate issue rule criticized as "a mere bit of empty rhetoric"). Finally, the
ultimate issue rule provides an improper standard for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. The
standard should be whether the opinion assists the
trie-r of fact, not whether it relates to an ultimate issue.
For example, in a forgery case the only contested issue may be whether_ the defendant forged a check. A
questioned document expert, because of his training
and experience, may be able to answer that question.
In such a case, an opinion on the "ultimate issue" is
both desirable and necessary. The expert, however,
would not be permitted to testify that the defendant
was "guilty"; he may testify, however, that based on
his examination the known· exemplars and the check
were written by the same person.
Federal Rule of Evidence 704, as originally enacted,
abolished the ultimate ·issue prohibition. Federal Rule
704(a) provides: "Except as provided in subdivision
(b), testimony in the f()riT1 o.f €in opinion or inference
otherwise-admissible is-not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fc'H::t:' See genera/1}13 o:Toilisell & C. Mueller,
supra, §§ 394-95; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, ,
704 [01]. As the drafters point out, however, Rule 704
does not open the door to all opinions on ultimate
issues:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the
bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rule 701 [lay
opinions] and 702 [expert opinions], opinipns must be
helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions
afford ample assurance against the admission of opinions
which would merely tell the jury what result to reach ....
They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 704.
Accordingly, the federal courts have admitted expert
opiilibri testimony regarding matters that could be considered "ultimate issues:' See United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1044 (1982) (undercover agent permitted to testify
that a person was acting as a "lookout"); United
States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (9th Cir.
1980) (treating physician permitted to testify that a person suffered serious bodily injury). See also United
States v. Gutierrez, 576 F.2d 269, 275 {10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978) (caution should be exercised before admitting opinions on ultimate issues in
criminal cases).

~~

EXPERIMENTS
Expert testimony is often based on experiments,
typically out-of-court experiments. Generally, testimony
based on an out-of-court experiment is admissible if
the experiment is conducted under the same or substantially similar circumstances as those involved in
the case. See Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 49-50
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Jackson v.
Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 1981); Hall
v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 180-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
For example, the results of tests conducted to determine muzzle-to-target distance have been admitted in
cases involving rifles and handguns as well as shotguns. E.g., State v. Castagna, 170 Conn. 80, 90-91,
364 A.2d 200, 206 (1976); People v. Carbona, 27 Ill.
App.3d 988, 1004, 327 N.E.2d 546, 561 (1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976); State v. Kahan, 268 S.C.
240, 245-46, 233 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1977); State v.
Brooks, 16 Wash. App. 535, 540, 557 P.2d 362, 366
(1976); State v. Tourville, 295 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1018 (1957); State v. Bates, 48
Ohio St.2d 315, 321-22, 358 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (1976),
vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978); Andrews v. State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083-84 (Okla. Grim.
App. 1976). As one court has noted, the "results of
tests to determine the distance from which a weapon
had been fired are admissible into evidence provided
the test was conducted under conditions sufficiently
similar to the actual conditions involved in the case
that they can be fairly said to have probative value
and will enlighten, not confuse the jury." Andrews v.
State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Okla. Grim. App. 1976).

Q

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the admissibility of experimental evidence is governed by Rules
401 to 403, namely, whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
misleading the jury. See generally 1 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra, § 103; C. McCormick, supra, §§ 202 &
215; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 445-60 (Chadbourn
rev. 1979).
lEARNED TREATISES
Learned treatises are frequently used in conjunction
with expert testimony. See generally C. McCormick,
supra, § 321; 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1690-1700
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). In all jurisdictions an expert
6

tJ

may be impeached with a learned treatise. There is,
however, disagreement as to the conditions under
which a treatise may be used for this purpose. Some
jurisdictions allow this method of impeachment only
when the expert relies on the treatise in reaching his
opinion. Other jurisdictions permit impeachment if the
expert recognizes the treatise as an authoritative work.
Still other jurisdictions permit impeachment if the
treatise is established as a recognized authority by
any means, including the testimony of other experts or
by judicial notice. See Advisory Committee's Note, R.
Evid. 803(18).
Under the traditional view, a learned treatise is
admissible only for impeachment. Accordingly, the
jury's use of a treatise as substantive evidence
violates the hearsay rule. In contrast, Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(18) recognizes a hearsay exception for
learned treatises, thus permitting their substantive use.
Fed. R. 803(18) provides:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by·the testimony or admission of the witness or by
other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted,
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.·
See generally 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 466;
4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, , 803(18)[01].
Accordin·g to the federal drafters, the "hearsay objection must be regarded as unimpressive when directed
against treatises since a high standard of accuracy is
engendered by various factors: the treatise is written
primarily and impartially for professionals, subject to
scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake:• Advisory Committee's Note,
Fed. R. Evid. 803(18).
There are two limitations recognized by the federal
rule. First, a treatise may be used substantively only
when an expert is on the stand. This requirement
provides an important safeguard because it ensures
that a knowledgeable person is available "to explain
and assist in the application of the treatise ...." /d.
Second, the treatise may be read to the jury but not
received as an exhibit, thus precluding its misuse in
the jury room.

States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). See also Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The purpose
of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full
disclosure to their attorneys.").
Application of the attorney-client privilege to expert
witnesses sometimes arises in scientific evidence
cases. Two different uses of experts must be distinguished. First, an expert may be retained for the purpose of testifying at trial. In this situation, the privilege
is waived. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036,
1046-47 (3d Cir. 1975); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640,
642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J.
576, 584, 392 A.2d 590, 595 {1978). See also United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) ("Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a
witness, waived the [work product] privilege with
respect to matters covered in his testimony."). A "party
ought not be permitted to thwart effective cross-examination of a material witness whom he will call at trial
merely by invoking the attorney-client privilege to prohibit pretrial discovery." Friedenthai, Discovery and
Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan.
L. Rev. 455, 464-65 (1962).
Second, an expert may be retained for the purpose
of consultation; that is, to provide the attorney with information needed to determine whether a scientific defense is feasible. If such an expert provides an adverse
opinion and the defendant nevertheless desires to proceed with the defense, typically through the use of
other experts, the question arises whether the attorney-client privilege precludes the prosecution from calling the defense-retained expert as a government
witness. See generally Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev.
597 (1980); Note, Protecting the Confidentiality of Pretrial Psychiatric DisClosures: A Survey of Standards, 51
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409 (1976}. If the expert is a physician
or psychotherapist, a separate privilege may be applicable. Many jurisdictions recognize a physician-patient
privilege and some recognize a psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See generally 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
supra, §§ 215-16; C. McCormick, supra, §§ 98-105; 2 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra ~ 504[01].
A number of courts have held that the attorneyclient privilege covers communications made to an
attorney by an expert retained for the purpose of providing information necessary for proper representation.
See United States v. Alvarerz, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47
(3d Cir. 1975) (psychiatrist); United States v. Kovel, 296
F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant); United
States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (financial expert); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d
784, 791 (Alaska 1979) (psychiatrist); People v. Lines,
13 Cal. 3d 500, 514-15, 531 P.2d 793, 802-03, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 234-35 (1975); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d
640, 642 (Fla. App. 1977); People v. Knippenberg, 66
Ill. 2d 276, 283-84, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1977) (investigator); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 520-22, 398 A.2d
421, 423-24 (1979) (psychiatrist); People v. Hilliker, 29
Mich. App. 543, 546-47, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833-34 (1971);
State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957);
State v. Hitopoulus, 299 S.C. 549, 309 S.E.2d 747

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege is designed to protect
confidential communications between a client and his
attorney. See generally C. McCormick, supra, §§ 87-97;
2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, §§ 207-13; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, 1 503 [01]; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. 1961). As the
Supreme Court has noted: "Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being
fully informed by the client." Upjohn Co. v. United
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§ee geDeil{l/ly Annat., 14 A,L.8.4th 594 (1982).
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 also extends the privilege to nontestifying experts. Subdivision (4)defines arepresentative of an attorney as
"one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of
professional legal ser\tices." The Advisory Committee's
Note states that this "definition includes an expert employed to assist in rendering legal advice." Advisory
Committee's Note, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, reprinted in 51 F.R.D. 315, 363 (1975). The ABA Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards (1984) adopt the
same position. Standard 7-3.3(b). The Standards
restricts· prosecutorial· access· to the results·of defense~initiated mental health evaluations of the defendant whenever the defendant does not intend to call
the expert as a witness.
The argument supporting this rule rests on the attorney's need to obtain expert advice. As one court has
noted: "Only a foolhardy lawyer would determine tactical and evidentiary strategy in a case with psychiatric
issues without the guidance and interpretation of psychiatrists and others skilled in this field." United States
ex rei. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd.556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977). An attorney, however, might
not seek such assistance if an expert's adverse opinion could be introduced by the prosecution: "Breaching the attorney-client privilege ... would have the
effect of inhibiting the free exercise of a defense attorney's informed judgment by confronting him with the
likelihood that, in taking a step obviously crucial to his
client's defense, he is creating a potential government
witness who theretofore did not exist." State v. Pratt,
28<!J-McC516,524;-·398 A2tl4'21, 426 (1979).
Other courts have rejected the extension of. the
attorlley~clie nf. privilege.. Tii ..tfiis ·context, .. altho'ugh their
reasons vary. First, some courts limit the privilege to
communications between the attorney and client.
Under this view, experts and other agents are not
covered by the privilege. E.g., State v. Carter, 641
S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. 1982}, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932
(1983}. Second, some courts have held that the privilege extends only to confidential communications and
thus does not apply to experts who do not rely on the
client's confidential communications in reaching their
opinions. Under this view, a psychiatrist may be protected by the privilege but not a fingerprint or questioned document expert. See United States v. Pipkins,
528 F.2d 559, 563-64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
952 (1976) (handwriting exemplars given to expert by
attorney not within privilege); People v. Speck, 41 111.2d

177, 200-01, 242 N.E.2d 208, 221 (1968). Third, some
courts hold that the privilege is waived when the de"
tense introduces scientific evidence. Accordingly, a
defendant who raises~an insanity defense waives the
privilege with respect to all psychiatrists who have examined the defendant. See State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d
54, 57 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983);
People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 624-25, 350 N.E.2d
400, 402-03, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25-26 (1976). But see
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir.
1975); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 791 (Alaska
1979); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 522, 398 A.2d 421,
424. '1919) ...'" ...•. ' ..•.
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, defendants have argued that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel precludes the use of
defense-retained experts by the prosecution. Several
courts have acc;::epted this argument:
A defense .attorney should be completely free and unfeitered in making a decision as fundamental as that concerning the retenti.on of an expert to assist him. Reliance
upon the. confidentiality of an expert's advice itself is a
crucial aspect of a defense attorney's ability to consult
with and advise his client. If the confidentiality of that
advice cannot be anticipated, the attorney might well
forgo seeking such assistance, to the consequent detriment of his client's cause. State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576,
587, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (1978) (handwriting expert).

See also United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046
(3d Cir. 1975); People v. Knippenberg, 66 111.2d 276,
283-85, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (1977).
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of this argument; other courts have rejected it. See Noggle v.
Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (6th Cir. 1983);
Granviel v. Estelle,· 655 F.2d 673, 683 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert~.ctenied,455.U.S. 1003 (19B2); United States ex
rei. Edney v. ·smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1054-55
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); State v. Craney, 347
N.W.2d 668, 67~77 (Iowa); cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255
(1984); State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 240-41 (Minn.
1982); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Mo. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
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